A French Cash-Machine for 1.4x FCF
It also owns hidden assets worth twice the current market-cap
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Today’s business is a nano-cap cash machine with hidden assets worth almost twice as much as the current market cap.
Let’s start with the ‘headline’ valuation metrics:
NCAV Ratio = 7.5
TBV Ratio = 2.7
EV/5Y FCF Ratio = 3.7
P/5Y FCF Ratio = 5.1
EV/TTM FCF Ratio = 1.4
P/TTM FCF = 2.0
This looks very much like a ‘cheap-to-earnings’ situation, while the earnings seem to be improving.
However, we need to look closer at the assets.
They include a series of 100% owned subsidiaries that are generating positive FCF in their own right.
These are recorded on the balance sheet under ‘intangibles’ because they were acquired.
To figure out how much these would be worth in the real-world I simply looked at the FCF records for each subsidiary and did a quick calculation of value.
In other words, how much could they be realistically sold for in a private, real-world, transaction.
When we factor this in, the asset base metrics adjust as follows:
NCAV Ratio = 2.3
TBV Ratio = 0.45
As you can see, this flips the set up from a purely ‘earnings’ play to one that has a margin of safety in both earnings and assets.
I’ll explain my calculations later on, but even if you don’t agree with the asset revaluation, this thing is still cheap to earnings and worth a look.
We do need to mention the shareholder yield though.
The average SH yield over the last 5 years is -0.4%.
It’s negative because there is dilution and SBC activity offsetting the buybacks and dividends.
It’s worth noting that the dilution has flipped into positive-returns during the last couple of years, with the TTM SH yield at +2.5% net.
In other words, the business seems to have stopped diluting and started shovelling cash back to shareholders in the last couple of years.
Overall, this is a very cheap stock with some (arguably) hidden assets offering a massive margin of safety.
Let’s take a closer look…
The Business
Qwamplify (ALQWA) is a French based marketing group, offering digital and data marketing services.
It helps brands recruit and retain consumers through two main activities:
Improving brand visibility via digital channels (Media) and managing promotional campaigns and customer relationships (Activation).
They generate revenue from fees and commissions.
Reporting is done through two segments, ‘media’ and ‘activation’.
The media segment specialises in helping companies increase brand awareness and acquire new customers.
They do this through a variety of channels such as SEO, paid search advertising, social media content management, email marketing campaigns and data analytics.
They charge fees for these services, normally billed monthly.
The activation segment focuses on promotional operations, CRM management and licensing deals.
For example, they might handle a ‘cash-back’ offer for one of their clients.
The client might offer their customers $50 back on every purchase of a specific product.
Qwamplify handles these promotions end to end and ensures they’re delivered as requested.
Revenues for this segment are generated through a combination of fixed set-up fees, and variable management fees.
For example, they might get paid based on the number of refunds processed during the campaign etc…
The revenues are generally split around 60/40 with most of it coming from the media division and the rest from activation.
They typically work with large corporate clients in the retail sector.
100% of their revenues come from Europe, with most of that being concentrated in France.
The story of Qwamplify over the last five years is a classic case of a cash-rich holding company attempting an aggressive acquisition spree.
In early 2020, Qwamplify sold its minority stake in Bilendi for €10.3M cash.
This gave them a massive war-chest relative to their size.
Instead of returning this cash to shareholders, management embarked on an ‘external growth strategy’ to build a digital media empire.
They diluted shareholders (raising €1M at €7.00/share) to buy a collection of digital agencies.
They acquired La Revanche des Sites (SEO), Meet Your Data (Analytics), and Kamden Media.
The company was profitable, cash-rich, and expanding its footprint into digital marketing to complement its historical activation (couponing) business.
In 2022, they continued buying, acquiring Eurateach (education) and Nouvoduo (creative agency).
But then, in 2023, the strategy hit a wall.
The group reported a massive Net Loss of -€9.1M.
Management admitted that while Gross Margin grew slightly (+2.5%), personnel costs exploded due to the integration of new teams.
The company was forced into a €10.8M impairment charge against the Goodwill of the companies it had just bought (mainly Bespoke and Activation).
They basically admitted that they overpaid for these assets and/or failed to integrate them.
In FY24 management stopped buying new companies and started cleaning up their operation.
They sold the subsidiary ‘Q3’ for a symbolic €1 (taking the loss) and, as of July 1, 2025, sold the Nordic operation to refocus strictly on France.
They merged the various small agencies (Adsvisers, G5K, Kamden) into single operating units (Bespoke and Activation) to cut administrative overlap.
On a TTM basis, the business is shrinking in revenue (down 20% due to a tough Retail market) but has become highly cash-generative through cost-cutting.
The ‘growth at all costs’ phase (2020-2022) failed and destroyed shareholder value.
The ‘Fix it’ phase (2023-Present) is working operationally, because the business is now a lean cash machine generating €3M-€6M in annual FCF.
This transition came after a change in the management structure, which indicates they are now on a different path.
The remaining disconnect is that the market still prices it like the failure of 2023, ignoring the cash generation of 2025.
This is where our opportunity lies imo.
The Financials
Most businesses have to pay for inventory or staff before they get paid by customers (Positive Working Capital).
Qwamplify is the opposite.
It utilises a negative working capital cycle, particularly in its activation division.
Here’s how it works:
A major brand (e.g., Kärcher, Samsung etc) hires Qwamplify to run a ‘Cash-Back’ campaign (e.g., “Get €50 back on this vacuum”).
Before the campaign starts, the client transfers a massive lump sum (e.g., €1 Million) to Qwamplify to cover the future refunds.
Qwamplify holds this cash in its bank accounts.
It does not belong to Qwamplify (it is recorded as a debt to the client), but Qwamplify physically holds it.
As consumers claim refunds, Qwamplify pays them out.
If fewer people than expected claim refunds, the leftover money is returned to the client or rolled over.
One of the core benefits of this type of business model is that Qwamplify earns interest on the money it holds.
In H125 alone, financial income from cash investments was €122k, contributing significantly to the bottom line.
The business rarely faces any kind of liquidity crisis because cash flows in before expenses go out.
It also requires almost no capex to run.
In FY23, the business generated €3.2M in operating cash while spending only €120k on equipment.
The balance sheet looks solid, but is also confusing.
A lazy investor sees €16M in the bank and thinks the company is rich.
In reality, €10M of that belongs to clients.
This actually explains why some data-platforms report the EV as being negative. They’re using client cash as part of the equation.
The accurate EV is around €6.83M (market cap is €8.62M).
This factors in all types of debt, including pension obligations, while excluding restricted cash.
At both prices (EV and MC) this business looks very cheap to both recent earnings and the hidden assets.
The actual cash available to owners here is €6M, and the net-cash (after debts) is €4M, which is strong against the market cap figure.
Other things that can mislead here is the receivables figure.
This is booked at almost €14M but a large portion of that is actually client funds for upcoming campaigns rather than invoices due.
Overall, the balance sheet is a bit of a minefield to figure out.
This is actually why I decided to calculate the true value of the subsidiaries myself, using data from the reports, rather than use the intangibles data.
This is how I calculated it:
There are 5 subsidiaries in total, Advertise me, Activation, Seekr, Bespoke, and Nouvoduo.
3 of them are profitable and cash-flowing.
I tried to use multiples that reflect real deals in the real-world and in my experience a high-level marketing style agency typically sells for between 3-7 x earnings.
I’ve actually bought (small) marketing agencies in the past, so used this experience to help me figure things out here.
The jewel in the crown is Advertise me, and I valued this one at 5x FCF (€7.1M).
The other two, Activation and Seekr, are lower quality so I valued these at 4x FCF (€4.3M and €1.4M respectively).
Bespoke and Nouvoduo are currently loss making but have solid equity values.
For these I just decided to apply a chunky discount (75% and 50%) to book value as the valuation metric.
This added a further €4.1M to the total pot.
As far as I can tell, the total break-up value of the group is somewhere in the region of €17M.
This valuation is far less than they were actually acquired for btw, which is probably why they have suffered such large write downs in recent years.
If we add the net-cash of the group, this increases to €21M.
Even excluding the net cash position, the total real-world value is pretty much twice the current market cap.
The income statement shows the story of the failed acquisition spree, and the recent recovery in earnings.
The cash flow statement shows that the recovery has been effective and aggressive.
For example, the business generated €3.5M in FCF during H125 alone, which is more than during any full year over the last 7 years.
Despite revenue dropping, the FCF has hit record highs in 2024/2025 because the business has stopped wasting money on acquisitions and high overheads.
Cash-conversion is also basically 100% because there is relatively little capex.
When we dig into the cash flow statement we see a business generating €3M - €6M annualised cash flow, trading at an Enterprise Value of €6.8M.
Another positive sign is that management seems to have finally grasped that the best way to allocate capital is to buy back their own stock at depressed prices.
They spent €675k buying stock in FY24 and €143k in H125.
Right now the market is pricing Qwamplify as the chaotic mess from 2023, rather than the efficient cash-machine it seems to have become last year.
If, like me, you have no social life and enjoy reading obscure financial statements, you’ll realise that Qwamplify is a healthy, cash-flowing business.
Why It’s Cheap
The stock price appears cheap relative to intrinsic value.
This is due to a combination of past capital allocation failures, accounting complexity, and market pessimism regarding the shrinking top line.
When you glance at this business it does look pretty lame.
It’s only when you start sifting through all the ‘noise’ that the value becomes much more compelling.
The market is most likely viewing the business as a destroyer of shareholder value (fair), without factoring in the recent change of course.
There is also the fear that value will be transferred to management rather than shareholders.
Note 2.4 in the 2024 report reveals plans to grant 750,000 Free Shares to employees/managers.
This represents potential 13% dilution, although this is performance based.
Presumably they need to grow the business significantly in order to earn this type of reward, although the reports don’t provide specific numbers.
Essentially, if the old management was still in place, the business would likely become a value-trap.
With the new management team there is a chance to unlock the value and achieve a normalised stock-price valuation.
This in turn, makes the dilution much more acceptable.
In H125, revenue also dropped 20% compared to the previous year.
However, there also lies another misunderstanding within this situation.
While revenue is dropping, profitability is rising.
Management has cut costs faster than revenue has fallen, leading to record FCF (€3.5M in H125).
The company’s accounts are difficult to understand for automated screeners or casual investors.
I can attest to this after staring at them, with tears silently rolling down my cheeks, for a couple of days.
Reported Operating Cash Flow swings wildly (e.g., -€1.6M in 2022 vs +€4.0M in H1 2025) due to movements in client funds.
This volatility makes the business look unstable, earning it a risk discount, even though the underlying cash-flow is stable and growing.
The stock is cheap because the market is pricing in past incompetence and future dilution.
However, the intrinsic-value analysis shows a business that has successfully restructured.
It’s also generating massive cash flow relative to its price.
The stock is cheap thanks to all these legacy issues, so the key is for the new management to demonstrate a move away from those dark days.
The Risks
Qwamplify has a lot of stuff going on right now.
This includes lots of things that could become problematic in time, if they deteriorate or develop.
Despite all this, there isn’t anything that concerns me right now.
They generate cash, they have more cash than debt and have demonstrated the ability to cut costs and become more efficient.
If I owned this business whole and came back off a long holiday today, I’d be annoyed at the board but glad to see them admit their errors through their recent actions.
The biggest thing I’d want to watch (aside from the financials) is the approach of the management team over the next couple of years.
I want to see significant improvement in the business. I want to see them do things to achieve a ‘fair’ stock-price valuation.
This means continued FCF generation within the recent ranges and no more talk of buying up companies and expanding the empire.
I’d also want to see the buybacks continue for the foreseeable future.
If they get that combination right, then reviving the stock price is actually a pretty simple task from this position.
This isn’t rocket science but them failing to do so is the biggest risk to this idea playing out.
The risk of involuntary delisting is also low.
The founder, Cedric Reny, holds 33% of the vote, but that is far too low to do anything aggressive and underhanded.
The Investment Case
From a real-world perspective, Qwamplify is cheap.
The idea rests on the premise that the market has priced the company for permanent value destruction, ignoring all the cash and the profitability of its core units.
Almost 43% of the current share price is backed by net cash.
We’re paying roughly €5M (after net-cash) for the entire operating business.
It generated €3.5M in FCF in just the last 6 months.
We don’t need anything magical, we just need the market to recognise that the management team have now stopped driving the business over a cliff.
This set up is also attractive because it allows all three of the top catalysts to play out.
The most obvious one is that the market recognises the turnaround that has already started.
If the next couple of updates continue with the positive trend, then the stock is primed for an asymmetric move to the upside.
Next, they have the cash and cash-flow to buy back meaningful amounts of stock.
This alone can generate a significant re-rating if they decide to focus hard and sustain the buybacks while the price is so low.
Finally, there is scope for an activist or competitor to buy them out.
It’s a good business with a solid brand and a book of large corporate clients.
The free-float is over 60% and the founder is a major shareholder.
Given the current pricing and the simplicity of fixing it (focusing on FCF efficiency and buybacks), this is a prime candidate for some kind of campaign or buyout.
Right now the turnaround is half-finished.
They have successfully cut costs and sold bad assets, but they have not yet stopped the revenue decline.
Buying today is a bet that the revenue will stabilize near current levels, or return to their recent average.
If it does, the stock is a multi-bagger.
If it doesn’t, the €6M cash pile provides a nice margin of safety.
I publish a new one every week, and every single one of them is a stock I’d rather buy (in a group) than any index.
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Thanks for the research, they look excellent - following you into these!